Traits and states are concepts that people use to both describe and understand themselves and others. We show that people view these concepts as prototype-based categories that have a graded internal structure and fuzzy boundaries and identify a set of attributes that define the prototypical cores of two categories: traits and states. Prototypical traits are stable, long-lasting, and internally caused. Prototypical states are temporary, brief, and caused by external circumstances. These prototypes are not defined by averages, as the family-resemblance principle would suggest, but by ideal (or extreme) attribute values. Like other ideal-based categories, traits and states serve particular goals. Trait concepts permit people to predict the present from the past; state concepts identify those behaviors that can be controlled by manipulating the situation. These two complementary schemas are part of the extensive theory of psychological causality that is implicit in language. Abstract social concepts differ from object categories in their category standards, the nature of their attributes, and the interrelations among those attributes.
relate our findings to the literature on the cognitive properties of abstract concepts.
Classification Issues
Most efforts to classify traits and states have focused on those terms in the natural language that are used to describe particular instances of these categories. In 1936, Allport and Odbert published a rough classification of the nearly 18,000 English person-descriptive terms found in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary On the basis of their understanding of each term's meaning, they assigned it to one of four categories: (a) personality traits; (b) temporary states, moods, and activities; (c) character evaluations; and (d) person descriptors not classifiable into one of the preceding categories. This initial effort was updated by Norman (1967) , who classified each term as one of the following: a stable trait, temporary state, temporary activity, social role or relationship, or one of four exclusion categories.
These taxonomies treat traits and states as discrete categories. 2 The classification of each term was based on the investigators' judgments as to whether the characteristic was stable over time. For example, Allport and Odbert (1936) categorized as trait descriptors those terms that refer to "consistent and stable modes of an individual's adjustment to his environment" (p. 26). States, on the other hand, were defined as "present activity, temporary states of mind, and mood" (p. 26). Norman (1967) differentiated traits from two types of temporary characteristics-states and activities.
Both Allport and Odbert's (1936) and Norman's (1967) classifications are examples of a classical or Aristotelian conception of categories (Smith & Medin, 1981) . In a classical conception of traits and states, the entire corpus of person-descriptive terms is divided into three discrete subsetsmone of traits, another of states, and the third of the remaining terms that are neither traits nor states. Within each class, all members are logically equivalent, although people may not perceive them as being equally good examples of their category (Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983) . Allen and Potkay (1981) have noted that some terms, such as anxious or depressed, have been classified either as states or traits depending on the views of the investigator, and that trait terms have been turned into state ones and vice versa simply by varying the instructions given to subjects when rating themselves on these terms. These observations led Allen and Potkay (1981) to conclude that the distinction between trait and state is inherently arbitrary and that it should be eliminated from our vocabularies.
There are at least two alternatives. Recent research on the differences among emotion descriptors and other types of person descriptors suggests that not all such terms can be neatly classified as either traits or states. For example, Ortony et al. (1987) called the boundary between the two categories "murky" (p. 354) and argued that descriptors "vary in what might be called their 'dispositional potential" Some words refer only to trait-like dispositions and resist any state reading at all (e.g., 'competent,' and 'trustworthy') . . . .
Other words can never be given trait readings (e.g,, 'gratified,' and yet others are ambiguous, having both a trait reading and a state reading (e.g., 'happy')" (1987, p. 350) . Therefore, Ortony et al. devised a tripartite classification system, dividing the domain into (a) words that clearly refer to states, (b) borderline cases that they call state-like conditions, and (c) others that they call frames of mind. This view of the trait-state distinction may be captured by a neoclassical conception, which retains the clearly defined boundaries of classical categories but permits some overlap among categories. The intersecting category contains those terms that can describe both a trait and a state.
Such unclear cases are of importance only if one wishes to achieve a classical definition in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes that apply equally to all category members. However, classical definitions are not the only route to achieving distinct categories (Wittgenstein, 1953 ). An alternative is to view each category in the light of its clear cases rather than of its boundaries (Rosch, 1978) . This conception does not require that the categories of trait and state be discrete and that all of their instances be clearly defined. Instead, each category is represented by its most prototypical exemplars; class membership does not need to be defined strictly but can be a matter of degree.
Definitional Issues
Most attempts to define traits and states have focused on a single attribute regarded as sufficient. The most frequently invoked attribute has been temporal stability. However, Allen and Potkay (1981) , as well as Fridhandler (1986) , have argued that stability is not a sufficient basis for the distinction. A number of alternative definitions have focused on other attributes, such as cross-situational consistency (Mischel, 1968) and personal versus situational causation (Spielberger, 1972) . However, as illustrated by the recent debate about the definitions of trait and state, scientists disagree about the sufficiency of these attributes as well.
The failure to establish a sufficient criterion for distinguishing traits from states does not mean that no definition is possible. According to a prototype view, categories can be defined by the attributes that differentiate the most prototypical members from less prototypical ones and from nonmembers (Rosch, 1978) . Indeed, we submit that attributes such as temporal stability, internal causation, and cross-situational consistency may each distinguish quite well the clear exemplars of traits from those of states, although each attribute may lead to somewhat different classifications for more peripheral exemplars of the categories. Thus, the categories trait and state may be defined by a cluster of correlated attributes, none of which is by itself necessary or sufficient.
Explicit Versus Implicit Conceptions
There are two ways of justifying the distinction between traits and states. One approach relies on empirical evidence that measures designed to assess traits differ from those designed to measure states. For example, measures of traits should have higher retest reliabilities than should measures of states, and state indicators should change more as a result of a relevant treatment 2 Nevertheless, Allport and Odbert noted that some of their classifications "are quite arbitrary" (1936, p. 28) . than should trait measures (Zuckerman, 1983) . However, this empirical distinction is a relative one. Trait measures do not have retest reliabilities of unity, and the reliabilities of state measures are not zero. For all measures that manifest intermediate values on these empirical criteria (e.g., retest correlations between 0 and 1), the researcher adopting the classical view is faced with a judgment as to whether the measure assesses a trait or a state.
A second approach is to provide a conceptual rationale for the distinction. Providing such a rationale has been the goal of a number of theorists (e.g., Cattell, 1963; Fridhandler, 1986; Norman, 1967; Spielberger, 1972) , and a variety of definitions have been proposed. Unfortunately, the intuitions of one theorist may not coincide with those of another (e.g., Allen & Potkay, 1983; Fridhandler, 1986) ; consequently, the same term is used differently, which leads to confusion in scientific discourse. One way out of this theoretical impasse is to return to the origins of these concepts. As illustrated by our initial quotation from Cicero, the concepts of trait and state far predate the advent of scientific psychology. Harr6 (1983) has argued "that the structure of ordinary language reflects and in part creates the psychology of the people who use that language, through the embedding of implicit theories in terms of which experience is organized" (p. 54). Indeed, even in the domain of intelligence "understanding implicit theories can help us to understand explicit theories because explicit theories derive, in part, from scientists' implicit theories of the construct under investigation" (Sternberg, 1985, p. 608) . By elaborating people's implicit conceptions of traits and states, the similarities and differences among the various definitions of these concepts may be clarified. Specifically, people's implicit knowledge of the trait-state distinction can be inferred from the meanings of the words they use to describe particular traits and states. Hence, we studied those person-descriptive terms that have been culled from ordinary-language dictionaries by personality taxonomers; the views of one such expert team (Norman, 1967) are used throughout this article as a frame of reference to evaluate our subjects' collective intuitions.
However, each time a person uses a trait or state descriptive term in discourse the term is embedded in a particular context. Which of the near-infinite number of potential contexts should be selected for study? If meaning is taken to reflect the most frequent usage of a word in typical contexts, it may not be necessary to specify a particular context. Indeed, Roseh (1978) has argued that prototypes are, in a sense, theories about context i t s e l f . . , when a context is not specified in an experiment, people must contribute their own context. Presumably, they do not do so randomly. Indeed, it seems likely that, in the absence of a specific context, subjects assume what they consider the normal context or situation. (p. 43) This is what subjects are expected to do in those assessment instruments that use adjectival descriptors, such as the Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) ; the terms are not embedded in a particular sentence context. In that case, Allen and Potkay (1981) have argued, people cannot reliably differentiate terms that describe traits from those that describe states. Similarly, Zuckerman (1983) argued that "single descriptive words used out of the context of a sentence cannot define either traits or states" (p. 1083). So far, there exist no data to support such claims.
Class M e m b e r s h i p : Classical, Neoclassical, Fuzzy, or A r b i t r a r y ?
In the first part of this article, we refute the claim that people's classification of terms that describe traits and states is arbitrary. If the distinction is not arbitrary or random, our next question is whether there is a clear boundary between the two categories. To establish that traits and states are prototypebased categories, it is not sutficient to show that people perceive gradations in category membership. Rather, one must demonstrate that there exist some person descriptors whose membership in one or the other category cannot be established. In this way, we argue, states and traits differ from classically defined categories, such as odd numbers and even numbers (Armstrong et at., 1983) .
We devised one classification task to test whether person-descriptive terms can be classified exclusively as traits, states, or neither, as suggested by the classical conception, and a second task to examine if the terms can be classified exclusively as traits, states, both, or neither, as suggested by the neoclassical conception. In addition, we obtained ratings of prototypicality to assess subjects' perceptions of degree of category membership when they are not constrained to make categorical decisions.
Classical Categorization

Method
The 75 person-descriptive terms used in this study are listed in Table  1 . This set includes 25 terms from Norman's (1967) lists of prime terms for (a) stable traits, (b) temporary states, and (c) temporary activities. -These three classes of terms were roughly equated for content and social desirability. In addition, we attempted to sample the terms representatively by using the clusters in Round VII of Goldberg's (1982) taxonomy as a guide. For the classical categorization task, 74 law students (51 men and 23 women) were paid to classify each of the 75 terms as either a trait, a state, or an activity descriptor. In this and all other tasks, no definitions of the categories were provided. The subjects were instructed to use only one category for each term and were informed that roughly one third of the terms were of each type. Table 1 presents the proportion of subjects who classified each term as a trait, state, or activity. The terms are grouped by their placement in the three Norman categories, within which they are ordered by the proportions of subjects who assigned them to that category. Across the 75 terms, there is clearly no evidence that these person descriptors were classified randomly by our subjects. Under random classification each of the 75 terms would have a 33% chance of being classified as a trait, state, or activity by a given subject. Thus, the probability that even 80% of the 74 subjects would agree on a term's classification is essentially zero. Yet, this level of agreement occurred for The argument that the categories are arbitrary is further weakened by the finding that at least a plurality of the subjects agreed with the classifications of the Norman team for 92% of the state terms, 92% of the activity terms, and 75% of the trait terms. 3 This level of agreement would hardly be expected if the distinction were arbitrary.
Results and Discussion
In conclusion, the large proportion of terms that received the same classification from a majority of the subjects clearly fulfills Allen and Potkay's (1981) criterion for a nonarbitrary distinct i o n -t h a t "people would be able to identify words that refer to stable characteristics and words that refer to temporary characteristics" (p. 918). On the other hand, there are a few terms whose classification could be construed as random. Overall, this pattern of classification is most compatible with the view that traits and states are prototype-based categories with fuzzy boundaries. However, it is conceivable that the subjects individually held classical conceptions, but differed in their definitions of the categories. If so, our aggregation of the subjects' classifications might make the category structures appear fuzzy. This possibility is evaluated in the following classification task.
Neoclassical Categorization
Method
For each of the 75 terms used in the classical task, 84 psychology graduate students were paid to make two dichotomous decisions. In one task, the subjects indicated whether each term denoted a trait; in the 3 The apparent lower agreement for traits than for the other two categories stems directly from Norman's (1967) rules for classifying uncertain cases. Because Norman needed a comprehensive set of traits for his empirical studies, he used the rule of thumb "When in doubt, call it a trait?' Consequently, Norman and his team classified as traits most of those descriptors here classified by roughly equal proportions of subjects as states and traits (e.g., suspicious, harsh, nonchalant, antagonistic) .
other task, the subjects indicated whether each term described a state. All subjects completed both tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced across the sample. Subjects were told to complete each of the two tasks independently and to feel free to call a descriptor both a trait and a state, or neither a trait nor a state.
Results and Discussion
Interjudge agreement was substantial for both types of judgments. For the trait versus nontrait distinction, the mean interjudge correlation was.52 and the coefficient alpha reliability of the mean ratings was .99; for the state versus nonstate distinction, the analogous values were.35 and .98. If subjects individually held classical conceptions, their two sets of judgments (trait and state) should have been mutually exclusive across the pooled set of 50 trait and state terms (the activity terms having been omitted). However, it seems clear that most subjects viewed the two categories as partly overlapping, as suggested by the median within-subject correlation of -. 4 8 across those 50 terms. Table 2 presents each of the four classification proportions resulting from the two types of judgments. For ease of comparison, the terms are listed in the same order as in Table 1 . In general, terms classified by Norman (1967) as traits were classified either as traits or as both traits and states, whereas those initially classified either as states or as activities were classified as states. Of all 75 terms, 59% were classified by at least a plurality of the subjects as states, 27% as traits, and 15% as both. Interestingly, none of the terms was classified by a plurality of subjects as neither state nor trait, and only one term (volunteering) elicited classifications of 30% or more in this exclusion category. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the classical view, which suggests that in this task activity terms be classified as neither trait nor state rather than as states.
Moreover, permitting the subjects to classify terms as both trait and state did not yield sharp boundaries between traits and states. On the one hand, trait terms such as moldable andj~ee-living, state terms such as aroused and infatuated, and terms that fall in the both category, such as energetic and suspicious, were classified relatively unambiguously. On the other hand, terms such as demanding and communicative elicited roughly equal classification proportions in the trait and the both categories, and thus argue against the neoclassical model. Similarly, unafraid, hesitant, and happy appear to be terms in the boundary region between the state and both categories. Thus, the both category itself seems to have fuzzy boundaries.
Prototypicality Ratings
Method
In each of two samples of introductory psychology students, subjects were randomly assigned to rate the prototypicality of the 75 terms as examples of personality traits, human states and conditions, moods and emotions, or human activities, respectively. Ninety-six subjects were recruited at a university in the Southeast and 51 at a university in the Northwest. Subjects were given prototypicality rating instructions similar to those used by Fehr and Russell (1984) . The subjects rated each of the 75 terms on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at allan example) to 7 (a perfect example).
Results and Discussion
Previous research on the relation between prototypicality and familiarity has yielded conflicting results (see Barsalou, 1985) . We found that our prototypicality ratings were associated with the familiarity, as well as with the social desirability, of the terms. Subjects had been told not to rate words whose meaning was unclear to them, and we estimated the familiarity of each term by its frequency of missing responses across the four categories. The social desirability of each term was indexed by the mean rating from 42 subjects who judged each term on a 9-point scale ranging from very undesirable to very desirable. The general typicality, or goodness as a person descriptor, of each term was indexed by the sum of the four prototypicality ratings. Because general typicality was significantly related to familarity (r = .44) and desirability (r = .38), each of the four mean prototypicality ratings was divided by the term's general typicality. These transformed ratios, which are unrelated to familiarity and desirability, are used here to index the relative prototypicality of a term for each of the categories.
For each category, the mean prototypicality ratings from the two samples were correlated; as shown in Table 3 , agreement between the two regions was substantial. Thus, our further analyses are based on the total sample. All but one of the prototypicality ratings had coefficient alpha reliability estimates exceeding .90. Moreover, the mean agreement between ratings made by pairs of individuals was impressive. To compare these values with those found in studies of nonsocial categories such as bird, vegetable, or furniture, we have included in Table 3 the corresponding values for the eight categories studied by Gernsbacher (1985) . The average agreement between two single judges about the prototypicality of person characteristics for the trait category (.34) is almost as high as it is for the prototypicality of examples of the bird category (.39).
The two prototypicality instructions designed to assess membership in the state category (Human States and Conditions and Moods and Emotions) elicited highly correlated mean ratings (r = .82); therefore, these two ratings were averaged to yield a single state-prototypicality index of higher reliability (a = .96). On the basis of the prototypicality values, the best examples of traits were transparent, trustful, and moldable," the best examples of states were afire, displeased, and miserable," and the best examples of activities were discussing, evaluating, and rushing.
In the prototype view, the status of person descriptors as either states or traits will be more or less clear depending on their prototypicality. Thus, agreement on the classifications in the classical and neoclassical tasks should be predictable from the prototypicality ratings. Table 4 summarizes the correlations between the three prototypicality values and the proportions of subjects who classified each term into the categories used in the classical and the neoclassical tasks. As indicated by the italicized convergent-validity coefficients, terms rated as highly prototypical with respect to one category were very likely to be classified by a high proportion of subjects in that category. These relations were replicated when the correlations were computed separately across the 25 terms within each of the three categories. That is, gradations in category membership were related to consensus of classification even when classical Note 9 The terms are listed in the same order as in Table 1 .
Proportion of Subjects (n = 84) Who Classified Each Term as a Trait (T), State (S), Both (B), or Neither (N)
a The category eliciting at least plurality agreement.
c a t e g o r y m e m b e r s h i p , as d e f i n e d b y t h e N o r m a n (1967) t e a m , was held c o n s t a n t . a From Gernsbacher (1985) , who reported only coefficient-alpha reliabilities; we estimated the corresponding mean interjudge agreement by reversing the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula. principle, ratings generated from a classical conception should be distributed bimodally. Unfortunately, this prediction is difficult to evaluate because other factors, such as individual differences in extremeness response bias, may influence the rating distributions. Nonetheless, inspection of these distributions revealed little support for the classical position. For example, of the 38 subjects who rated trait prototypicality, the distributions of only 4 (11%) appeared at all bimodal. Indeed, more than half of the subjects assigned at least 35% of the terms a middle value (3, 4, or 5) on the 7-point rating scale.
A g a i n , it is possible t h a t t h e p r o t o t y p i c a l i t y ratings were consistent w i t h a classical c o n c e p t i o n at t h e i n d i v i d u a l -s u b j e c t level. To explore this possibility, we e x a m i n e d the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f e a c h s u b j e c t ' s p r o t o t y p i c a l i t y ratings a c r o s s t h e 75 t e r m s . I n
Discussion o f Category-Mernbership Studies
Our results have shown that the classification of trait and state descriptors is generally not arbitrary. However, we also found, both for individual subjects and for data aggregated across subjects, that the classifications are not always discrete. In the classical task, there were a few terms whose classification into either category might appear to be arbitrary. The neoclassical task did not yield sharp boundaries either, because the both category was not clearly differentiated from the trait or the state category. A prototype conception, on the other hand, can account for the nonarbitrary yet nondiscrete nature of the categories. 4
How Viable Is the Classical View?
Nevertheless, several auxiliary assumptions might render the classical view compatible with these findings. Recently, Fehr and Russell (1984) have argued that the classical view of emotional states is untenable on empirical grounds. According to Ortony et al. (1987) , however, Fehr and Russell's demonstration that subjects cannot agree on the membership status of some particular instances does not compel the conclusion that the category cannot be defined in classical terms. Specifically, the classical view might be salvageable if either (a) people do not know the attributes necessary and sufficient for category membership (i.e., they are ignorant of the meaning of the concept), or (b) people do not know whether particular instances possess those attributes (i.e., they are ignorant of the meanings of the terms).
The assumption that our subjects, graduate students in law and in psychology, did not know the meaning of these concepts seems implausible, given that their classifications agreed not only with each other but also with those made by an expert team. The second assumption implies that subjects should have disagreed most about the classifications of those terms whose meanings were the least familiar to them. We compared the extent of classification agreement for the most and least familiar terms and found no support for this prediction. Subjects' agreement about the classification of individual descriptors was not related to their knowledge of the meanings of these descriptors. Rather, the agreement proportions were strongly related to the relative prototypicality of the descriptors even within the classically defined categories.
F u z z i n e s s --I n the Concepts or in the Words?
How should one interpret our finding that some person descriptors have unclear membership status in the trait and the state categories? One interpretation is that such cases arise not because the categories are fuzzy but because some terms have two distinct meanings--a trait meaning and a state meaning. Just as it would not be justified to conclude that the categories noun and verb are fuzzy because subjects disagree about the classification of the word bear, so it would not be justified, this argument goes, to conclude that traits and states are fuzzy categories because subjects disagree about the classification of some person-descriptive terms. According to this interpretation, terms that receive a high percentage of classifications in both categories would have a trait and a state meaning of roughly equal salience; for the terms that receive few classifications in both categories, only one meaning is highly salient.
One way to evaluate this interpretation of the both category is to examine the attributes that differentiate traits from states. Terms with two equally salient meanings should be difficult to 4 These conclusions are not affected by the observation that the membership status of exemplars may change as a function of the context in which they occur (Barsalou, 1987) . Some sentence contexts, such as She is a . . . person and I feel... . right now, strongly imply trait and state attributions, respectively; in these contexts, the descriptors classified here as both (e.g., suspicious) will be interpreted as either trait or state. Paradoxically, this observation has been interpreted as evidence for the arbitrary (Allen & Potkay, 1983) and for the classical view (Zuckerman, 1983) . However, highly prototypical descriptors are anomolous in these sentences (e.g., She is an aroused person and I feel reliable right now), suggesting that the meaning of these descriptors is not arbitrary. Nor does context always make the distinction between traits and states discrete, as is shown by sentences such as Peter is an angry young man. This context implies traitlike duration in a characteristic typically seen as a short-lived state. The meaning of a descriptive sentence thus seems to depend on both the context and the nonarbitrary default meaning of the descriptor used; therefore, the analysis of the typical meaning of person descriptors is central to an understanding of more complex forms ofperson description, such as sentences or full narratives. rate on most attributes. Subjects would first have to decide if they were rating the trait or the state meaning and then make their rating accordingly. Consequently, these terms should receive more variable attribute ratings than terms that have either a salient trait or a salient state meaning.
Our intuitions, however, lead us to suspect that person-descriptive terms such as energetic, suspicious, and determined do not have multiple meanings that are as distinct as those for the word bear. Bear (the animal) and bear (to carry) have literally nothing in common. In contrast, suspicious (the trait) and suspicious (the state) are not so distinct. They are defined by the same behavioral referents, and there are times when we feel quite uncertain whether a person's suspiciousness is just a state or really a trait. Whatever our intuitions, only an analysis of the attributes of traits and states can provide an empirical answer to the argument that fuzzy cases simply reflect multiple meanings.
Attributes o f Traits and States
The existence of fuzzy cases suggests that previous attempts to find necessary and sufficient attributes that differentiate traits from states may have been misguided. Instead, we suggest that one should focus on attributes that characterize the most prototypical exemplars. Characteristic attributes are those that are highly correlated with the prototypicality values of the exemplars for that category. Another implication of the prototype view is that the attributes that are characteristic of a category are likely to co-occur in the exemplars. Rosch (1978) has hypothesized that object categories are formed around bundles of related attributes. For example, most creatures with feathers have wings and beaks, and most creatures with fur do not; creatures that have feathers, wings, and beaks tend to be birds. For a few object categories, Malt and Smith (1984) have shown that characteristic attributes tend to cluster together. We now examine this hypothesis in the social categories, trait and state.
to eat on a diet, a goal-derived category that people may construct ad hoc. The best exemplar of this category would be a food that had zero (or even negative) calories. Clearly, such a food represents an ideal or extreme, rather than the average, caloric value of the members of this category. Barsalou (1985) concluded from his studies that family resemblance tends to be the more important determinant of prototypicality in taxonomic categories (those used for classification of objects or events), whereas ideals tend to be more important in ad hoc categories (those constructed for particular purposes or goals). On the one hand, traits and states resemble taxonomic categories, which are lexicalized (often as single words), and thus differ from ad hoc categories, which usually are not lexicalized. On the other hand, traits and states differ from both taxonomic and ad hoc categories in that they are abstract and social. So far, the relative importance of family resemblance as compared with ideals has been examined in neither abstract nor social concepts. Given that Hampton (1981) found that for some abstract concepts family resemblance does not account for internal structure, the definition of trait and state might be based on ideals rather than on family resemblance.
To summarize, we suggest that it is possible to identify attributes that differentiate prototypical traits from prototypical states. We will sample attributes proposed by diverse analyses of the two concepts and then show that those attributes that indeed differentiate the concepts are also substantially interrelated across their members. Moreover, we will examine whether the prototypes of the two concepts are defined by values that are ideal or, as the family-resemblance principle would suggest, by values that represent an average across the category members. Finally, whereas Barsalou's (1985) pioneering investigation of ideals was limited to one attribute per category, we will be able to examine the possibility that some categories may be associated with ideal values on multiple attributes.
Family Resemblance Versus Ideals
According to most prototype conceptions, an exemplar's prototypicality depends on its family resemblance, which is defined as the exemplar's similarity to other category members and its dissimilarity to members of alternative categories (Roseh & Mervis, 1975; Tversky, 1977) . For example, robin is a more prototypical member of the category birdthan is ostrich, because a robin is more similar to other birds than is an ostrich. Whereas the family-resemblance principle seems to predict the internal structure of concrete concepts such as bird or vegetable, some evidence by Hampton (1981) suggests that it cannot account for the internal structure of some abstract concepts, such as rule, belief and instinct. However, little seems to be known about the structure of abstract concepts of this sort.
Recently, Barsalou (1985) has suggested that the factors that determine internal structure may vary widely across types of categories. In particular, Barsalou showed that in addition to family resemblance and frequency, ideals can serve as another determinant of internal structure. Ideals are "characteristics that exemplars should have if they are to best serve a goal associated with their category" (p. 630). Consider the category foods
Review of Previously Proposed Attributes
Most central to the trait-state distinction is the attribute of temporal stability. Although theoretical conceptions of personality traits vary considerably, all imply "some form of enduring tendency, proclivity, or inclination to behave, think, or respond in certain ways over time" (Buss, 1985, p. 165-166) . Stability is central to the definitions of traits offered both by Allport and Odbert (1936) and by Norman (1967) ; traits are considered to be stable or consistent over long periods of time, whereas states are viewed as temporary or inconsistent manifestations. Moreover, temporal stability is central to Cattelrs (I 963) conceptualization of the trait-state distinction; for Cattell the primary basis for distinguishing traits from states rests on the stability of responses across time, occasions, and measures.
Another time-related attribute, duration, refers to the length of time that relevant behaviors or experiences last. Norman (1967) invoked this attribute to distinguish between long-lasting traits and brief states and activities. Hence, we hypothesized that trait terms would describe those behaviors and experiences that last the longest, whereas state and activity terms would describe those of shorter durations.
A third attribute that might distinguish traits from states is their locus of causality. As Zuckerman (1983) has pointed out, states should change as a function of relevant external conditions, whereas traits should not. Indeed, some theorists assume that states are caused primarily by conditions external to the person, whereas traits are causal factors that reside within the person (e.g., Allport, 1937; Cattell, 1957) . Thus, we hypothesize that terms that refer to internally caused characteristics will be considered traits, whereas externally caused characteristics will be considered states.
A fourth attribute may be the frequency with which a characteristic has to occur before it is attributed. In his discussion of trait and state anxiety, Spielberger (1983) argued that "persons with high Trait-anxiety exhibit State-anxiety elevations more frequently than low Trait-anxiety individuals" (p. 1; emphasis added). Indeed, the frequency with which a characteristic is manifested within a given period of time has been assigned central theoretical status in Buss and Craik's (1983) act-frequency approach to personality dispositions.
Conceptually related to frequency is situational scope. This attribute reflects the number of different situations in which relevant behaviors must be observed before the characteristic is attributed. For some theorists, this attribute is the necessary and defining characteristic of traits; only those behaviors that occur consistently across situations are said to reflect traits (Mischel, 1968) . Apparently, then, person descriptors that imply a wide situational scope will be considered traits, whereas states should be of more narrow scope.
The work of Endler, Hunt, and Rosenstein (1962) suggests that traits may be more intense than states. In their analysis of anxiety, these investigators argued that one person may be called anxious and another not because the former showed more intensity in his or her anxious behaviors. The intensity attribute was included in our study to explore this suggestion.
Finally, Weiner's (1979) research suggests that controllability may be an additional relevant attribute. According to Weiner, ability traits and mood states are seen as uncontrollable, whereas efforts are seen as controllable. Hence, we hypothesized that activities, like efforts, will be perceived as being under volitional control and therefore easy to change, whereas states and traits will be seen as more difficult to change.
Measuring the Attributes Method
We developed dimensional measures of each of the attributes that had been hypothesized to differentiate between traits and states, s To assess stability, we used the proportion of subjects who classified each term as stable rather than temporary. The remaining attributes were measured on rating scales, the instructions for which are presented in the Appendix. The 74 law students (51 men and 23 women) who provided the judgments in the classical categorization tasks served as subjects and were paid for their participation. An additional sample of 29 advanced psychology students rated the controllability attribute in class. Both samples rated the same set of 75 terms used in our previous analyses. The terms were ordered randomly and differently for each of the judgments. Approximately one half of the law student sample received the scales assessing stability, duration, frequency, situational scope, and in- Note. Values in parentheses reflect the elimination of unreliable judges.
tensity; the other half received those assessing causality, stability, frequency, and duration. Each scale appeared on a separate page of a questionnaire, and the order of the scales was counterbalanced across the subjects.
Results
The reliabilities of the attribute ratings are presented in Table  5 . The mean ratings were quite reliable, with alpha coefficients ranging from .82 (intensity) to .98 (stability). Table 6 presents the correlations among the seven attribute scales, plus social desirability. Five of the seven attributes listed in Table 6 (stability, duration, causality, frequency, and situational scope) formed a highly correlated cluster; the mean and median intercorrelations among these five attributes were .59 and .57, respectively. The two other attributes (intensity and controllability) were not part of this cluster but were related to each other; characteristics rated as most intense were rated as least controllable.
Classical versus prototype views. How are the attributes related to prototypicality? If the prototype of these categories consists of ideal values, the correlations between the prototypicality ratings and the attribute dimensions should be high. That is, the more extreme the attribute value of an instance, the higher the prototypicality rating of that instance. The correlations between the attribute and prototypicality ratings are presented in Table 7 . Across all 75 terms, each of the five interrelated attributes was strongly positively related to trait prototypicality, strongly negatively related to state prototypicality, and virtually unrelated to activity prototypicality. The other at-5 We asked psychology faculty members and graduate students to list properties of traits and states, and most of the properties they generated were graded (rather than discrete) and bipolar (rather than unipolar) dimensions. The graded nature of the categories was reflected in the use of adverbial modifiers (e.g., more abstract, used more often, learned earlier), whereas the bipolarity was reflected in the use of labels for each of the two poles of the dimension (e.g., situational vs. enduring, consistent vs. inconsistent). The specific properties mentioned most often can be represented as temporal stability, duration, locus of causality, and situational scope. Note. These correlations were computed across the 75 terms. Correlations larger than .22 are significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test).
tributes, intensity and controllability, were not related to trait prototypicality and not strongly related to state and activity prototypicality. Because the correlations across terms drawn from all three categories may confound the effects of classical category membership with the prototypicality gradations within each category, we also computed the correlations separately within the sets of 25 trait, 25 state, and 25 activity terms. As shown in Table 7 , these correlations were similar to those computed across all 75 terms. This finding provides further evidence against the classical view because it shows that prototypicality and attribute ratings are related in predictable ways within each class of terms. To compare more directly the prototype with the classical conception, we also conducted stepwise multiple regression analyses across all 75 terms to predict each of the attribute dimensions from the two kinds of membership indexes. Classically defined membership (e.g., trait vs. nontrait) was always entered first into the equation, with prototypicality entered second. For each of the five attributes found to be associated with the trait-state distinction, adding trait prototypicality led to a significant increase in the multiple correlations. For example, for stability the multiple correlation was raised from .66 to .87; for causality, from .69 to .83.
Kinds of prototypes: family resemblance versus ideals.
According to the family-resemblance principle, the more similar a category member is to its fellow category members, the more typical an example it is of that category. A member's family resemblance can be indexed by its average similarity to all other members or, when the attributes are dimensional, by its similarity to the central tendency (or average value) of the members on the relevant attribute dimensions (e.g., Barsalou, 1985) . To estimate the central tendency for the trait and state categories, we computed the mean values of the 25 trait terms and the 25 state terms on each of the five attribute dimensions. As an index of each term's similarity to the category's central tendency on an attribute, we computed the absolute difference between the rating of that term and these averages. If the concepts state and trait were structured by family resemblance, the correlations between these absolute differences and the prototypicality ratings should exceed the original correlations reported in Table  7 . This, however, was not the case. When the correlations were computed across all 75 terms, the original correlations were larger than those based on the absolute differences for all five relevant attributes and for both the trait and state prototypicality ratings. When computed separately across the 25 trait and 25 state descriptors, the original correlations were larger in 90% of these comparisons. Whereas these analyses were focused on a term's similarity to a central tendency on each particular attribute, family resemblance is usually taken to mean an instance's similarity to the category average across the total set of attributes. Moreover, family resemblance has been assumed to depend not only on the instance's similarity to the average of its own category but also on its dissimilarity to the central tendency of contrast categories. Because trait and state serve as contrast categories for each other, we were able to compute an overall family-resemblance index that reflected both similarity to the trait (and dissimilarity to the state) averages across all five relevant attributes.
We used Cronbach and Gleser's (1953) generalized distance measure (D 2) to index the similarity of each term's profile of attribute ratings to the profile of the average of the 25 trait descriptors and that of the average of the 25 state descriptors. Because the interpretation of D 2 is simplified when the variables included in the profile are orthogonal, we summarized the five attribute ratings with three orthogonal principal components and computed scores for each term on each component. To obtain central-tendency profiles for the trait and state categories, we averaged the component scores of the 25 trait terms and 25 state terms, respectively. For each of these 50 terms, we computed two dissimilarity indexes, one to the trait and one to the state central-tendency profiles. As an overall index of family resemblance, we subtracted each term's dissimilarity to the trait profile from its dissimilarity to the state profile. Thus, a high value of this index means that the term is similar to traits and dissimilar to states, whereas a low value reflects the opposite pattern.
However, this composite index of family resemblance did not strongly predict either of the two prototypicality ratings. Indeed, the family-resemblance index correlated only .38 with trait prototypicality in the set of 25 traits and -.48 with state prototypicality in the set of 25 states, correlations that are actually smaller than several between the prototypicality ratings and the single attribute ratings shown in Table 7 . These findings were replicated with a two-component solution and with the original (nonfactored and therefore nonorthogonal) attributes. Apparently, the internal structure of the trait and state categories is not well described by family resemblance, even when multiple attributes are considered.
Multiple meanings and variability in the attribute ratings.
If terms classified by a high percentage of subjects as both trait and state were so classified because they have two equally salient meanings, they should elicit particularly high interjudge variances in their attribute ratings. However, for all but one of the attributes, the variances of the attribute ratings were negatively rather than positively related to the number of subjects who categorized a term in both categories. Moreover, only two of the correlations differed significantly from zero, one each in the expected and the unexpected directions.
Of course, one could argue that each subject provided an average attribute rating for those terms that have distinct state and trait meanings. However, if the terms classified in both categories have two distinct meanings, then subjects should find it difficult to average their judgments across these two meanings, just as it is difficult to average, in a sensible way, judgments about bear (verb) and bear (noun) . Apparently, then, descriptors receiving a high percentage of classification in both categories are no more likely to have multiple meanings than are any other person descriptors.
Attributes of Traits and States: A Replication Study
We have identified a number of attributes that empirically distinguish prototypical descriptors of traits from prototypical descriptors of states and activities. As predicted, these five attributes formed a highly interrelated bundle, and each of these attributes was substantially related to prototypicality, even within each of the three categories. The more extreme a trait term's value was in the right direction on an attribute dimension, the more prototypical it was of trait descriptors. The more extreme a state term's value was in the opposite direction, the more typical it was of state descriptors. For example, the more stable a characteristic is, the more prototypical it is of traits; the more unstable it is, the more prototypical it is of states. The finding that proximity to extreme values rather than proximity to category averages best predicted prototypicality suggests that ideal attribute values comprise the prototypes for traits and states.
We now need to test the generalizability of these findings across different samples of descriptors and of subjects. Indeed, our findings might be limited to the particular set of terms that we selected or to our use of a particularly sophisticated sample (law students) to provide the attribute ratings. Moreover, the inclusion of the activity descriptors in our stimulus set may have affected our subjects' judgments.
Method
We wished to replicate our findings both with the same set of 25 trait and 25 state descriptors (activities now excluded) and with an additional set of 50 (25 trait and 25 state) person descriptors. In particular, we were concerned that some of the state terms in the initial set could be distinguished from the trait terms simply because they ended with the suffix ed. In the replication study, any association between categories and syntactic forms was eliminated by selecting the additional 25 terms of each type so as to balance the number of traits and states ending in each suffix. The additional 50 terms were also selected from Norman's categories of prime terms for traits (25 terms) and states (25 terms). The instructions for the prototypicality and attribute rating scales were identical to those used in our previous studies, with the activity category Note. The values in parentheses reflect the elimination of unreliable judges.
and the intensity and controllability attributes omitted. Social-desirability ratings were obtained for all 100 terms. The subjects in this study were college undergraduates (N = 231), a less verbally skilled sample than the law students who had participated in our initial investigation. Of these subjects, 112 rated the prototypicality of each term as a trait, state, or mood; roughly two thirds of these subjects attended a university in the Southeast, whereas the remaining third attended a university in the Northwest. The other 119 subjects, all from the Northwest, rated the terms on one of the five attributes or on social desirability. Each of the prototypicality and each of the attribute ratings was obtained from an independent sample of subjects. Our analytic procedures were identical to those used in our previous studies. In particular, because the mood and state prototypicality ratings were again highly related, the two sets of ratings were averaged to yield a more reliable measure of state prototypicality. Moreover, to eliminate the effects of social desirability and familiarity from the prototypicality ratings, the latter were corrected for general goodness of example, as previously described. As a consequence, the prototypicality values for the trait category were perfectly (negatively) related to those for the state category, and therefore only one set of values needs to be reported here. Table 8 presents the findings from the reliability analyses and Table 9 the correlations among the attribute scales. The findings from both types of analyses mirrored almost exactly the pattern obtained in our initial study. The only exception was the correlation between frequency and situational scope (.85 in the initial study and .45 in the replication), a finding probably owing to the fact that in the initial study the same subjects rated both attributes. However, even in this between-subjects design, all of the attributes again formed a correlated bundle. The mean intercorrelation among the attributes was .55 (Mdn = .53).
Results
Of primary interest was whether the ratings of the attributes would again be highly related to prototypicality, as suggested by the ideal-prototype conception. Table 9 includes these correlations. As in the initial study, stability was the attribute most highly related to the prototypicality ratings, followed by causality. The only difference in the findings from the two studies was that frequency and situational scope, despite their lower reliability in the replication study, related more highly (rs = .56 and .51, respectively) to trait prototypicality than in our initial study, their correlations now being of approximately the same magnitude as that of the duration attribute (r = .54). Finally, we compared the ideal prototype to that based on family resemblance. For each of the five attributes, we assessed the similarity of the instances to two central tendencies, one based on the 50 trait terms and one based on the 50 state terms. As in our initial study, the correlations based on the ideal always exceeded those based on family resemblance.
General Discussion
We began with an empirical refutation of the claim that the distinction between traits and states is arbitrary. We have demonstrated that although the discrete classification of some instances is difficult, the classification of most instances is quite clear. Moreover, the prototypical cores of the categories can be differentiated from each other by a set of attribute dimensions. Overall, our findings are most consistent with the view that traits and states are prototype-based categories, represented by ideal exemplars that are defined by multiple dimensional attributes.
These findings suggest that the structural properties of traits and states differ from those of other types of categories. In contrast to the natural-object categories typically studied by cognitive psychologists, traits and states are social categories that, by definition, refer to people, their characteristics, and their experiences. Moreover, we suggest an additional distinction among social categories. Concrete social categories refer to classes of people such as personality types (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) and social groups (e.g., Hamilton, 1981) . Abstract social categories refer to characteristics of people and social events. Among person characteristics, the categories trait and state seem the most important; others include beliefs and instincts (Hampton, 1981) and emotions (Fehr & Russell, 1984) . Instances of these Note. These correlations were computed across the 100 terms. Correlations of .20 or larger are significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test).
categories are not observable but must be inferred, and most of these instances can function both as categories in their own right and as attributes of person categories. For example, the trait altruism refers both to acts of giving, a category of interpersonal events (John, 1986) , and to one of the attributes stereotypically associated with the person category women. There are reasons, then, to expect that properties of the categories state and trait would differ from the properties of object categories and concrete social categories and would resemble the properties of other abstract categories.
Implications for the Properties of Social Categories
Cognitive models of categorization were developed largely in the relatively narrow domain of object categories that can be labeled by nouns and represented within a single hierarchy. It has been recognized only recently that categories may differ systematically in their structural properties (e.g., Barsalou, 1985; Lakoff, 1987; Lingle, Altom, & Medin, 1984) . We will consider here three properties that distinguish traits and states from other categories. The first property is the standard people use to represent the category. Initially, it was assumed that the average or typical member of a category was the category standard (e.g., Rosch, 1975) and that the instances were organized on the basis of their similarity to this prototype. Later, Smith and Medin (1981) argued that categories could also be represented by actual exemplars. Such exemplars are often paragons (Lakoff, 1987) or, more generally, the most easily recalled members of a category (e.g., Babe Ruth for the category baseballplayer) rather than typical members. A more recent proposal is that at least some categories are represented by ideals (Barsalou, 1985) .
A second important property of categories involves the nature of the attributes that characterize their members (Lingle et al., 1984) . Attributes may be qualitative features (e.g., has wings for the category bird) or quantitative dimensions (e.g., height for the category basketballplayer). Finally, a third property refers to the number of attributes that people use to represent the category and to process information about its members. For some categories, only a single attribute may be sufficient (e.g., number of calories for the category foods to eat on a diet), whereas for others multiple attributes are required (e.g., having fur, bearing live young, and being warm-blooded for the category mammal).
Category Standards
Our finding that the categories trait and state are represented by ideals extends Barsalou's research to the domain of abstract social categories. Moreover, we can now propose an explanation for Hampton's (1981) failure to find a family-resemblance structure in the abstract categories instinct, belief and rule. All of these seem to be social and thus similar to trait and state. Indeed, many social categories, even concrete ones, may be based on ideals. For example, social stereotypes typically reflect the characteristics of extreme rather than typical group members. Thus, the stereotypical fraternity member, as depicted in the movie Animal House, is a person who is extremely loud, obnoxious, and academically unmotivated, hardly a reflection of the average fraternity member. Likewise, social roles such as criminal also appear to be represented by extreme exemplars.
The more cunning, cold-blooded, and dangerous one is, the better one reflects our conception of a criminal.
The hypothesis that many social categories are based on ideals is consistent with Barsalou's suggestion that goal-oriented categories tend to be so based. Presumably, the manner in which people organize the social world is influenced by their goals and needs. For example, stereotypes serve to simplify one's social world by sorting people into groups, so that individuals within each group can be treated homogeneously. Similarly, social roles provide an ideal standard against which performance can be evaluated. Finally, the categories trait and state seem to serve people's need to predict, control, and explain interpersonal events. For example, knowing that a person is dispositionally violent suggests avoiding future interactions, whereas knowing that a situation made a person angry would lead to a different course of action.
Nature of the Attributes
In most previous studies, the attributes of concepts have been obtained from listings generated by samples of subjects. For categories of natural objects, subjects typically list unipolar qualitative properties, called features, such as has wings or made by humans (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984) . In linguistic and anthropological research, on the other hand, the most frequently studied attributes are encoded as bipolar contrasts, such as married versus unmarried. Dimensional (or graded) attributes, such as size and ferocity for birds or dangerousness for weapons, have been studied much less frequently (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Smith & Medin, 1981) . In contrast, the attributes derived from theoretical accounts of the trait-state distinction seem to be dimensional (see Footnote 5), perhaps because, in contrast to objects and to person types, each trait and state is itself an inherently dimensional concept. That is, manifestations of any particular state or trait can be quantified on an intensity dimension either by means of adverbial modifiers (e.g., very intelligent, somewhat upset) or by contrasts among separate terms (e.g., annoyed, angry, outraged).
In ideal-based categories, increments in attribute values are reflected in the extent to which the instance is representative of the category; thus, if the attribute is dimensional, the category must have a graded internal structure, as we found for trait and state. Moreover, we suspect that the dimensional nature of the attributes is also responsible for much of the fuzziness we found in the classification tasks, because the imposition of any discrete cutoff point is arbitrary. Thus, it seems unlikely that a classical conception could appropriately capture the structure of categories whose attributes are dimensional and whose standards are ideals.
The relative importance of dimensional and feature attributes in social settings is difficult to evaluate on the basis of available research. Dimensional representations permit fine discriminations among instances on the basis of a single attribute (Garner, 1978) . That would seem to be particularly important in social contexts in which one attribute is of particular concern. For example, before attending a social function with a member of a fraternity we would probably be far more interested in his degree of obnoxiousness than his academic motivation or his overall similarity to our stereotype. Conversely, as his academic advisor our focus would probably be reversed. Likewise, when interacting with someone described as violent, our sense of control over that person's behavior may be more affected by its degree of internal causality than by its stability. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to suggest that judgments of the similarity among instances often do not conform to the constraints and relations implied by dimensional representations (Tversky, 1977) . Thus, although dimensional attributes may seem inherently useful for social categorization and show impressive relations with prototypicality ratings in this study, it remains to be demonstrated that people actually use dimensional attributes to represent categories, social or otherwise.
Number of Attributes
We were able to identify five attributes whose extreme values seem to define the ideal prototypes of traits and states. To examine the relative importance of these dimensions, we used stepwise multiple regression analyses to predict trait prototypicality from the five attribute ratings. Across the 75 terms used in our original study, only stability and causality had significant regression weights (the standardized coefficients were .67 and .24, respectively), and the multiple correlation was .88. In the replication study, stability and causality were again the only significant predictors of trait prototypicality (with standardized regression weights of .69 and .20), and the multiple correlation was .86. Given that a single dimensional attribute can provide fine gradations, it may not be surprising that two of our attributes predicted prototypicality so well that the others became redundant. However, attributes may serve functions other than increasing the accuracy of classification.
First, classification (or prediction) should not be confused with understanding (or explanation). Although stability predicted prototypicality extremely well, that attribute by itself does not provide a complete understanding of traits and states. Analogously, one can identify birds with almost perfect accuracy if one knows merely whether the object has feathers. However, a bird is more than a collection of feathers. Likewise, a full understanding of the essence of traits and states must be based on all the attributes included in this study (and perhaps others as well). The essence of trait is not simply stability but also includes internal causation, situational scope, and so forth. The ideal state concept is not simply unstable, it also occurs less frequently, lasts for shorter periods of time, is externally caused, and is more situationally tractable.
Second, the existence of several relevant attributes permits substantial interrelations among them, thereby increasing the usefulness of these concepts for predicting and controlling behavior. Once a particular instance of behavior has been categorized as a trait or state, perhaps on the basis of one attribute such as its cross-situational consistency or its stability, inferences can be drawn about its other, previously unobserved attributes, such as duration or causal locus. This process of attribute-to-attribute inference is similar to the distinction between membership and inference attributes made by Lingle et al. (1984) . Membership attributes are used to determine the members of the category, whereas inference attributes are those one can infer from category membership. For social categories such as traits and states, an attribute's status as a membership or an inference attribute may not be fixed but instead may depend on the information available to the observer. Thus, if one happens to observe that a characteristic is manifested across situations, one would classify that characteristic as a trait. This classification, in turn, permits the inference that the behavior will remain stable over a long period of time. In other circumstances, the roles of situational scope and stability might be reversed. One way to interpret the finding that stability is the best predictor of prototypicality is that stability serves as a membership attribute more often than do the other attributes, perhaps because it is the easiest to observe. In conclusion, although it has been shown that a single dimensional attribute may be sufficient to classify the instances of some categories (Barsalou, 1985; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987) , the advantages of multiple and related attributes are so obvious that we expect them to be a general property of social categories.
Traits, States, and Attribution Theories
So far we have discussed the general structure of the trait and state categories. We now consider the particular attributes that we found to be associated with the two concepts. The five attributes represent a variety of different views, including those of experts in personality classifications (Allport & Odbert, 1936; Norman, 1967) , a major critic of trait psychology (Mischel, 1968) , and several investigators interested in constructing measures of traits and states. However, what is most striking about this set of attributes is its resemblance to dimensions postulated by attribution theorists.
Temporal stability, so central to the definition of traits, is also a key dimension in Weiner's (1979) theory of causal attribution; in Kelley's (1967 Kelley's ( , 1973 model, this dimension is called consistency Equally central to these attribution theories is the attribute of internal versus external locus of causation--the judgment whether an event was caused by the person or the situation. Situational scope and frequency also have equivalents in attributional frameworks. Situational scope marks the opposite pole of a dimension Kelley (1967) called distinctiveness," behaviors that a person exhibits across many different situations are said to be low in distinctiveness. McArthur (1972) showed empirically that people attribute such behaviors to a person's characteristics--that is, traits. Regarding the frequency attribute, attribution research has shown that characteristics that occur consistently (or frequently) over time will also be viewed as resuiting from person characteristics--that is, traits.
However, in attribution theories the attributes are conceptualized as mutually independent. For example, the cause of a successful accomplishment may be stable-internal-uncontrollable (ability), stable-external-uncontrollable (task difficulty), and so on. However, among those person characteristics that are labeled by single words, we have found substantial relations among these dimensions. It appears that two salient combina-tions of those attributes have been singled out in our language--characteristics that are stable, internally caused, and so forth (traits), and characteristics that are variable, externally caused, and so forth (states). In both sets of terms studied here, most descriptors fell into the stable-internal and the variable-external cells, a few into the variable-internal cell (e.g., determined), and none in the stable-external cell. That is, there are many terms describing the stable-internal and variable-external characteristics, whereas relatively few describe variable-internal and stable-external characteristics.
Why should these two kinds of person descriptors be predominant in language? In interpreting our ideal-based prototypes, we have suggested that traits and states serve people's needs to predict, explain, and control social behavior. The easiest way to accomplish this would be to have only two kinds of person characteristics. The first kind would include those that enable people to predict behavior reliably over time and situations and thus lead to social actions focused on the person (e.g., to seek out or to avoid people with that characteristic). The second kind of characteristic, being unstable over time, cannot be predicted from past experience with the person but may be controlled by manipulating the situation. That is, we suggest that trait concepts serve the goal of predicting interpersonal events from past behavior, whereas state concepts serve the goal of identifying events that may be under situational control.
This interpretation is consistent with the hypothesis that a theory of psychological causality is implicit in language itself (Brown & Fish, 1983) . Indeed, in our initial set of 75 person descriptors we found that the state terms ended more frequently in the suffix ed than did the trait terms. This association provides an example of the syntactic coding of important sociocultural concepts into language and demonstrates again that states and traits are natural categories. We conclude that these two kinds of person descriptors refer to important concepts within the sociocultural knowledge system that organizes the layperson's understanding of human action (Lalljee & Abelson, 1983) .
As we suspected, the implicit definitions of traits and states elaborated here have much in common with recent explicit definitions of these two concepts (Rowe, 1987) . Neither type of definition, we believe, is arbitrary. When Wittgenstein (1953) first introduced the notion of natural categories, he argued that although he could not state precisely where the light from his desk lamp ended and the dark in his study began, the concept of light was still useful and legitimate. We fed that the trait and state concepts similarly can shed light on many issues in personality and social psychology. Although the distinction between traits and states is fuzzy, it is hardly arbitrary.
Instructions for the Attribute Rating Scales
Stability Some words are used to describe only temporary feelings and behaviors that people exhibit. Other words typically describe more stable and enduring aspects of a person's personality. For each of the words listed below, indicate whether you think it typically describes a temporary or a stable personality characteristic. (Subjects were further instructed to circle a letter, T = Temporary or S = Stable, beside each word.) Duration Some of the words on this list describe feelings. For each of these words, indicate how long you think a person typically feels this way when he/she is feeling that way. Other words describe things people do. For these words, indicate how longa person typically does these things when he/she is doing them. Finally, there are some words that describe states of mind. For these words indicate how long a person is typically in this state. ( 
Frequency
Our choice of words to describe people, or things people do, may depend on how often we see a person exhibit the behaviors or feelings that are described by a particular word. That is, we use some words to describe people if they act that way only once, but other words are used only after we have observed the acts or feelings they describe many times. For each of the words on the list, indicate how many times you must observe the behaviors or feelings it describes before you use it to describe a person. (Subjects rated the words on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = only once to 5 = more than 6 times.)
Situational Scope
People behave differently in different kinds of situations, for example, at home, in school, at work, on a date, etc. Our choice of words to describe people may depend on the number of different kinds of situations in which we see them exhibit the behaviors. For each of the words listed below, indicate in how many different situations you typically have to see a person exhibit the behaviors before you use the word to describe that person. (Subjects rated the words on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = only I situation to 5 = more than 5 situations.)
Controllability
Listed below are a number of words that describe people's behaviors, experiences, and feelings. Some of these behaviors and feelings are more difficult for a person to change than are others. For each of the terms listed below, indicate how easy or difficult it would be for a person to change that way of acting or feeling, assuming the person wanted to change it. (Subjects rated the words on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = very difficult to changeto 7 = very easy to change.)
Intensity
Our choice of words to describe other people may depend on how strongly a person exhibits the feelings or activities described by these words. For each of the words listed below, indicate how strongly a person must exhibit these feelings and behaviors before you use the word to describe him or her. (Subjects rated the words on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = weakto 5 = strong.)
